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Millicorp Letter Filing Re Securus Petition for Declaratory Judgment Dc 2011

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2 3 0 0 N S T R E E T, N W







202 383 3343
P M A R C H E S I E L L O @ W B K L AW


Via Electronic Comment Filing System
June 17, 2011
Marlene H. Dortch
Federal Communications Commission
445 12th Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20554

Securus Petition for Declaratory Ruling, WC Docket No. 09-144

Dear Marlene H. Dortch:
By this letter, Millicorp, on behalf of its affiliates and subsidiaries (collectively
“Millicorp”), seeks to refresh the record in the above-referenced docket. As further set forth
herein, Millicorp’s primary business is the provision of IP-based telephone services to the friends
and family members of inmates. Specifically, a Millicorp customer informs Millicorp at what
facility the customer’s friend or family member is incarcerated, and Millicorp assigns to its
customer a telephone number local to that facility. When an inmate calls the customer’s
Millicorp-assigned local number, Millicorp terminates the call to its customer, thereby causing
the inmate to be charged for a local call from the prison, rather than a much more expensive
long-distance call. This substantially lowers the cost paid by the families and friends of inmates,
thereby enabling inmates to keep in more consistent contact with their friends and family
members during incarceration.1


In addition to this line of business, Millicorp also has entered into a partnership with Correction
Concepts Incorporated (“CCI”) to design and deploy an advanced technology inmate communications
system at a 624-bed prison facility to be constructed by CCI in Wakita, Oklahoma. The low to medium
security prison for adult males is expected to open in 2012 and is the first of four planned confinement
facilities for which CCI and Millicorp have partnered. The other three will be an adult female facility, a
juvenile facility, and a geriatric facility. See Press Release, Millicorp, LLC, Millicorp to Provide Next
Generation Inmate Communication System for New Habilitation-Focused Prison to be Built in Wakita
Oklahoma (May 12, 2011) available at
Further, Millicorp has developed an IP-based holistic communications application for the Apple iPhone,
which recently was approved by Apple for release in the Apple App Store.

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 2
Millicorp has demonstrated in its prior filings that Securus Technologies, Inc.
(“Securus”),2 Global Tel*Link Corp. (“GTL”),3 and other similarly situated inmate calling
service (“ICS”) providers have no authority under applicable laws and the rules of the Federal
Communications Commission (the “Commission”) to block inmate calls to Millicorp’s
customers. To the contrary, the Commission’s rules prohibit call blocking by common carriers
absent an express exception. No ICS provider has been granted such an exception to date,
although Securus has petitioned for such an exception for ICS providers.4 Yet rather than wait
for the Commission to rule on this request, Securus and GTL are engaging in impermissible self
help by aggressively blocking inmate calls to Millicorp’s customers in violation of the law and
the Commission’s rules.
Securus and GTL have argued that the need for security justifies blocking calls to
subscribers of Millicorp’s service (“CCH”), who generally are friends and
family members of inmates. Yet Securus’ and GTL’s ultimate motivation for blocking calls to
Millicorp’s customers is financial, not security related. Millicorp’s services reduce the cost of
inmate calls to CCH subscribers, which is perceived by ICS providers to reduce their revenue
and the monopoly profits that they enjoy due to their exclusive control of prison
telecommunications services. ICS providers should not be permitted to arbitrarily block calls to
CCH subscribers while permitting calls to subscribers of other, non-fiscally threatening but
technically similar services.


Securus is controlled by H.I.G. Capital, LLC, a private investment firm with over $8.5 billion of
capital under management, and currently is in the process of being purchased by Castle Harlan Inc.,
another private equity firm with over $6 billion of capital under management. See Hillary Canada, LBO
Blog, Castle Harlan's Latest Deal Connects Inmates To The Outside, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2011.
Through two ICS operating subsidiaries, T-Netix, Inc. and Evercom Holdings, Inc., Securus provided ICS
as of December 2009 “to approximately 2,400 correctional facilities in the United States and Canada, and
processed over 10 million calls per month during 2009.” Securus’ services are offered in 44 states and
Washington, DC. In addition to local, county, state and private correctional facilities, Securus also holds
ICS contracts with juvenile detention centers. See Securus 2009 10-K at 3.

GTL, which recently was acquired by a group of private investors led by Veritas Capital and the
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., provides ICS to over 900,000 inmates and their families. See Reply
Comments of Global Tel*Link Corporation, WCB Docket No. 09-144, filed Sept. 10, 2009, at 3; see also
Streamlined International Applications Accepted for Filing, Report No. TEL-01453S, Public Notice (rel.
Sep. 3, 2010) (describing the ownership of GTL); Carrick Mollencamp, Gregory Zuckerman, and Laura
Saunders, Dividend Rock: Firms Reward Buyout Bosses, WALL ST. J., October 14, 2010 (“Veritas
Capital and a group of investors are expected to begin marketing a $600 million debt deal for a company
they control called Global Tel-Link that is expected to include a $173 million dividend to Veritas and
other investors . . . .”).

Petition for Declaratory Ruling filed by Securus Technologies, Inc., dated July 24, 2009
(“Securus Petition”).

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 3
For these reasons, Millicorp respectfully renews its request that the Commission
promptly deny the Petition for Declaratory Ruling filed by Securus (“Securus Petition”)5 and
declare that the blocking of inmate calls to the customers of Millicorp and similarly situated
companies is unlawful.


The ICS Industry

The ICS industry is a niche segment of the telecommunications market that provides
telephone service to confinement facilities throughout the United States. ICS providers enter
exclusive contracts with a particular confinement facility to offer inmates at that facility
telephone calling capability. ICS providers generally offer two calling options: (1) collect
service and (2) prepaid service. The Securus Petition relates only to prepaid ICS provided to
Confinement facilities often require ICS providers to establish security procedures
applicable to inmate telephone services. These procedures are intended to limit prisoners’ ability
to place unwanted calls to unwilling recipients, such as judges, prosecutors, and witnesses, and to
prevent the use of the calling system to perpetrate or coordinate crimes.
ICS security procedures are generally similar across facilities.6 First, facility telephones
for inmate use are programmed to block calls to protected phone numbers, including the
telephone numbers of judges and prosecutors.7 Second, inmates often are permitted to call only
a specified list of persons whose identity and telephone number is pre-registered by the inmates.
In many cases, phone privileges are granted only after the inmate submits this calling list.8
Additionally, for those prisoners opting to use prepaid service, the call recipient often must
establish a prepaid account with the ICS provider. The recipient must submit a billing name,
address and phone number with the ICS provider before the prisoner can place a prepaid call to
the call recipient.9 After these safeguards are in place, confinement facility employees are

Securus Petition; see also Comment Sought on Petition for Declaratory Ruling of Securus
Technologies, Inc., Public Notice, WC Docket No. 09-144, 24 FCC Rcd 10603 (2009).

See Securus Petition at 2-3.


See Securus Petition at 3; see also Securus 2010 20-K at 4 (“Security and public safety concerns
associated with inmate telephone use require that correctional facilities have the ability to control inmate
access to telephones and to certain telephone numbers and to monitor inmate telephone activity.”)
(emphasis added).

See Securus Petition at 2-3.

See Reply Comments of Securus Technologies, Inc., WC Docket No. 09-144, dated Sept. 10,
2009, at 15 (“Securus Reply Comments”).

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 4
provided the ability to monitor and record calls made by inmates. Furthermore, the ICS platform
creates call logs that record the pre-approved telephone numbers to which each inmate call is
ICS providers are telecommunications common carriers generally subject to Title II of
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (“Communications Act”).11 The Commission has
exempted such ICS providers from a limited number of common carrier regulations. Most
relevant here, the Commission authorized ICS providers to block calls to competitive carriers via
“800” or “950” access numbers, which inmates could use to “dial-around” facility
communications security to any number they wished to call.12
For various reasons, ICS providers have been able to use their exclusive ICS contracts to
charge excessively high rates for telecommunications services to inmates and to recipients of
inmate calls.13 For example, inmates often are charged per-call set-up fees, which can be as high
as $3.95 per call, plus up to $0.89 per minute for interstate calls and $0.69 per minute for
intrastate calls, which can result in charges of $15 or more for a ten-minute telephone call.14
These prices are far in excess of market-based prices for telephone services and cannot be
justified on the basis of security alone.15


See Securus Petition at 3.


See Securus Petition at 2 (“Inmate telephone providers are subject to all federal and state
regulations applicable to non-incumbent telecommunications common carriers.”).

Policies and Rules Concerning Operator Service Providers, Report and Order, 6 FCC Rcd
2744 (1991) (“1991 TOCSIA Order”).

See John E. Dannenberg, Nationwide PLN Survey Examines Prison Phone Contracts,
Kickbacks, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, April 15, 2011, available at displayArticle.aspx (describing in detail the “egregious nature of
exorbitant prison phone rates” offered by ICS providers) (“Nationwide PLN Survey”).

See Nationwide PLN Survey; see also Ex Parte Letter from Frank Krogh, Attorney for Martha
Wright Petitioners, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 96-128, filed March 16, 2009.

The Commission is considering in a separate proceeding, CC Docket No. 96-128, whether to
take certain actions to address the consistently high rates charged by ICS providers. The Commission
issued the most recent notice of proposed rulemaking in this pending proceeding eight years ago. See
Implementation of the Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Order on Remand and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd
3248 (2002) (“Inmate Payphone Rulemaking”). Further, the Commission incorporated into Docket No.
96-128 a rulemaking petition filed in 2003 by Martha Wright and other inmate petitioners (“Wright
Petitioners”) requesting the Commission to introduce additional competition into the ICS industry. See
Petition for Rulemaking Filed Regarding Issues Related to Inmate Calling Services Pleading Cycle
Established, Public Notice, CC Docket No. 96-128, DA 03-4027 (filed Nov. 3, 2003). Most recently, the

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 5

Millicorp’s CCH Service

Millicorp operates ConsCallHome (“CCH”), an Internet Protocol-based communications
service offered to friends and families of prison inmates around the country. The CCH service
allows subscribers to receive prepaid telephone calls from an inmate at the lower local rates
charged by ICS providers, avoiding the much higher long-distance rates that are common in the
ICS industry.
To set up a Millicorp account, a potential CCH subscriber must provide their name,
billing address, telephone number, a valid credit card number,16 and the location of the prison
facility in which their friend or family member is incarcerated. Once an account is established,
Millicorp provides the CCH subscriber with a telephone number assigned to the same local
exchange as the relevant prison facility (the “CCH telephone number”). Millicorp purchases
these telephone numbers and certain VoIP transport services from wholesale VoIP providers.
When an inmate calls the CCH telephone number, the call is automatically terminated through
VoIP technology to the CCH subscriber.17 CCH has sole control of the location to which such
calls are terminated. Each inmate call to a CCH subscriber terminates to a single telephone
number. Millicorp does not offer its customers any ability to independently forward or re-route
the calls which they receive through CCH to any other telephone number.18
All calls by inmates to recipients using CCH are subject to the same security procedures
as calls to non-CCH recipients. Specifically, the call recipient must establish a prepaid account
with the ICS provider and submit a billing name, address, and telephone number for their
account, just as non-CCH recipients must. In addition, confinement facility employees retain the
ability to monitor and record any call by an inmate to a CCH subscriber. Furthermore, the ICS

Commission sought public comment in 2007 on an alternative ICS rate regulation proposal filed by the
Wright Petitioners. See Comment Sought on Alternative Rulemaking Proposal Regarding Issues Related
to Inmate Calling Services, Public Notice, 22 FCC Rcd 4229 (2007).

A very small percentage of CCH subscribers pay by mailed check.


Calls to the subscriber’s CCH telephone number are either terminated to the home or mobile
telephone number assigned to the CCH customer by their local carrier or, if the subscriber purchases
interconnected VoIP services from Millicorp, the calls are terminated through the CCH customer’s
broadband connection in the same manner as calls are terminated to the customers of any other
interconnected VoIP provider, such as Vonage.

Securus has gone to great lengths in its filings to questions the legitimacy of Millicorp’s CCH
service by arguing that Millicorp’s service does not comply with the Commission’s definition of
interconnected VoIP service. As set forth in Section III(B) below, Securus’ fixation on the exact
regulatory classification of Millicorp’s customers is not germane to this proceeding and is intended
merely to distract the Commission from the impermissibility of Securus’ call blocking activities.

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 6
platform can still record the telephone number that each inmate calls, including calls to CCH
telephone numbers.

Call Blocking by ICS Providers and the Securus Petition

Beginning in late 2008, ICS providers began identifying and blacklisting calls to some of
the CCH-provided local telephone numbers of Millicorp’s CCH customers.19 In July 2009,
Securus, apparently questioning the legality of its self-help actions, asked the Commission to
declare that the ICS providers’ exemption from the prohibition on dial-around blocking also
permits ICS providers to block calls to customers of Millicorp and similarly situated
companies.20 A broad cross-section of interested parties, including ICS providers, prisoner
advocacy groups, state corrections officers, members of the general public, and Millicorp, have
together filed over 150 documents in the proceeding discussing a wide variety of issues related to
ICS. The Commission has not yet acted on Securus’ Petition. In the meantime, Securus and
GTL continue to impermissibly block calls to Millicorp’s CCH customers.21


See Millicorp Comments, WCB Docket No. 09-144, filed Aug. 28, 2009, at 10-11.


See Securus Petition at 1& n.1 (“Securus . . . petitions the Federal Communications
Commission . . . for a declaratory ruling that call diversion schemes are a form of dial-around calling
which Securus is permitted to block under the Commission’s previous ruling . . . .” and “The sole issue
presented here is that the Commission’s existing precedent permits Securus to block attempts to use call
diversion schemes.”).

As a result of Securus’ impermissible blocking of calls by inmates to CCH customers,
Millicorp filed with the Commission an informal complaint against Securus and GTL requesting the
Commission to investigate their activities. See Request for Investigation Letter to Trent Harkrader,
Deputy Chief, Investigations & Hearings Division, Enforcement Bureau, FCC, from William P. Cox,
Counsel for Millicorp, dated July 15, 2009. Millicorp understands that the Commission is not likely to
act on this complaint until such time as the Commission has acted on the Securus Petition. In addition,
Millicorp filed a lawsuit against GTL and certain of Securus’ subsidiaries in October 2009 in the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of Florida seeking damages for the defendants’ violation of the
Section 201 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 201, as well as pursuant to various common law
commercial torts and state consumer protection statutes. See Millicorp v. Global Tel*Link Corporation,
No. 09-23093 (S.D. Fla. filed Oct. 14, 2009) (“Millicorp Complaint”). The court ultimately determined
that the Commission was the proper venue for ruling on the issues raised in Millicorp’s judicial complaint
due to the pendency of Millicorp’s informal complaint before the Commission. See Millicorp v. Global
Tel*Link Corporation, No. 09-23093, slip op. (S.D. Fla. April 14, 210). The Court’s decision was filed
by Millicorp in this docket. See Letter to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications
Commission, from William P. Cox, Counsel for Millicorp, Docket No. 09-144 (filed April 16, 2010).

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 7


Absent an Express Exemption, Federal Law Prohibits Common Carriers From
Blocking Telephone Calls

The Commission has clearly determined that, absent an express exemption, call blocking
by common carriers is a violation of the Communications Act. According to the Commission,
Because the ubiquity and reliability of the nation's telecommunications network is
of paramount importance to the explicit goals of the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended, . . . we reiterate here that Commission precedent does not permit
unreasonable call blocking by carriers.22
The Commission is clear that this prohibition is a longstanding and fundamental common
carrier obligation.
The Commission has been, and remains, concerned that call blocking may degrade
the reliability of the nation's telecommunications network. Additionally, the
Commission previously has found that call blocking is an unjust and unreasonable
practice under section 201(b) of the Act. Specifically, Commission precedent
provides that no carriers . . . may block, choke, reduce or restrict traffic in any
Although this determination by the Commission was issued in the specific context of traffic
pumping issues, the Commission nevertheless is clear that the “general prohibition on call
blocking” is applicable to all common carriers, “except in rare circumstances” in which the
Commission has affirmatively permitted common carriers to block calls.24 Even when a carrier
believes that another provider is violating the Commission’s rules, common carriers “may not
engage in self help actions such as call blocking” absent express permission from the


Establishing Just and Reasonable Rates for Local Exchange Carriers, Call Blocking by
Carriers, Declaratory Ruling and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 11629 ¶ 1 (WCB 2009) (citations omitted) (“Call
Blocking DRO”).

Call Blocking DRO ¶¶ 5-6.


Call Blocking DRO ¶¶ 6-7.


Call Blocking DRO ¶ 1.

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 8

Securus and GTL Have No Express Exemption And Therefore Their CallBlocking Practices Violate the Communications Act

As noted above, Securus, GTL, and other similarly-situated ICS providers are common
carriers “subject to all federal and state regulations applicable to non-incumbent
telecommunications common carriers.”26 As common carriers, ICS providers are therefore
prohibited from blocking calls unless the Commission expressly permits such blocking.
The Commission has not given Securus and GTL permission to block calls to CCH
subscribers. That Securus found it necessary to file the Securus Petition essentially admits that
no express permission has been granted. Thus, the self help practiced by Securus and GTL when
they block inmate calls to the customers of Millicorp and other similarly situated companies is a
direct violation of ICS providers’ obligations under Section 201(b) of the Communications Act
to refrain from unjust and unreasonable practices.27

ICS Providers’ Limited Exemption From the Prohibition on Dial-Around
Blocking Does Not Provide Authority to Block Calls to Millicorp’s CCH

As noted above, the Commission has permitted ICS providers to block “dial-around”
calls to “800” and “950” numbers. The order permitting the blocking of dial-around calls did not
authorize ICS providers to block other inmate calls, such as calls to CCH customers.28 In the

See supra at 3; Securus Petition at 2; see also Securus 2010 10-K (“The inmate
telecommunications market is regulated at the federal level by the [FCC] and at the state level by public
utilities commissions or equivalent agencies . . . of the various states.”).

47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (“All charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in
connection with such communication service, shall be just and reasonable, and any such charge, practice,
classification, or regulation that is unjust or unreasonable is hereby declared to be unlawful . . .”).
Further, such call blocking also is a violation of Section 201(a) of the Communications Act, which states
that “it shall be the duty of every common carrier … to furnish such communication service upon
reasonable request thereof.” 47 U.S.C. § 201(a); see also Millicorp Complaint at 13-16.

Although the Securus Petition only requested the Commission to determine that services such
as Millicorp’s CCH service should be treated as dial-around services, Securus also appears to claim in the
Securus Petition that the Commission’s Billed Party Preference Order authorizes Securus’ call blocking
self-help measures. See Billed Party Preference for InterLATA 0+ Calls, Second Report and Order and
Order on Reconsideration, 13 FCC Rcd 6122 (“Billed Party Preference Order”). Billed party preference
(“BPP”) is a billing method applicable to telephone calls made from payphones. Specifically, operatorassisted BPP calls are carried by the operator service provider (“OSP”) preselected by the party being
billed for the call. Millicorp’s CCH service does not involve operator assistance. Therefore, just as
Millicorp’s CCH service does not qualify as a dial-around service, it also does not qualify as a BPP

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 9
Securus Petition, Securus argues that CCH is a “dial-around” service and asks the Commission
to therefore authorize the blocking of such numbers. The Commission should reject the Securus
Petition because the CCH service clearly is not a dial-around service.
First, dial around calling is a call routing service selected by the inmate caller by dialing
an “800” or “950” access number. Yet CCH services are not available to inmates. Millicorp’s
CCH service is purchased by inmates’ friends and family members—the inmates’ call recipients.
The inmate is not “dialing-around” an ICS system but instead is using the ICS system to call a
CCH subscriber. The very existence of the CCH service is transparent to the inmate placing the
call. In fact, the inmate may not even know that their friend or family member is a CCH
Second, when a caller makes a dial-around call, once the caller reaches the competitive
carrier’s platform by dialing an “800” or “950” access number, the caller then must separately
dial the number of the party he or she wishes to call. By contrast, a call by an inmate through an
ICS system to the local telephone number of a CCH customer is terminated directly to the call
recipient without providing the inmate any opportunity to input a second telephone number to
reroute the call.
Third, dial-around calling enables the caller to complete a telephone call to any telephone
number once the caller has reached the dial-around provider’s platform. Thus, dial-around
calling could be used by an inmate to contact judges, prosecutors, witnesses, or any other party
who would object to receiving the inmate’s call. By contrast, Millicorp’s CCH customers
subscribe to Millicorp’s service for the express purpose of facilitating the ability of inmates to
call the customers. The CCH service cannot permit inmates to complete calls to parties that do
not want or intend to receive the inmates’ calls.
Finally, inmate calls to CCH customers are not “dialed-around” an ICS provider’s
platform to reach another carrier’s platform. When using a dial-around service, the caller pays
only the rates of the competitive dial-around carrier, and does not pay the original OSP. By
contrast, calls to CCH’s customers are initiated by inmates over an ICS provider’s platform, just
like calls to non-CCH customers. As a result, the ICS provider is compensated for these calls
and the calls are subject to the security features intrinsic to the ICS provider’s platform.
As the above makes clear, Millicorp’s CCH service is not a dial-around service, and
Millicorp is not a dial-around provider. Thus, the exception created in the 1991 TOCSIA Order
does not apply to CCH or similar services. Therefore, ICS providers are not permitted to block
inmate calls to CCH customers under current law. Moreover, the Commission should reject the
Securus Petition and refrain from expanding the dial-around exception to cover a completely
different type of communications service. Further, while the Securus Petition remains pending,

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 10
the Commission should take action to halt ICS providers’ blocking of inmate calls in
contravention of the Commission’s rules.


As described above, Millicorp’s services save inmates’ families significant sums by
offering subscribers a local CCH number, thereby enabling them to avoid the extremely
expensive long-distance rates charged by ICS providers. Such savings to CCH subscribers are
perceived by ICS providers to represent lost revenue and profits. ICS providers therefore have a
financial incentive to discourage inmates’ families from subscribing to CCH and similar
services, and ICS providers act on this incentive in various improper ways, including by blocking
CCH numbers.
As an initial matter, Millicorp believes ICS providers’ perception of lost revenue may be
misguided. Inmate calls to CCH numbers, like all other inmate calls, still generate revenue for
the ICS providers, albeit at the lower local rate. However, it is possible, if not likely, that an
increase in inmate call volume enabled by the lower local rate paid to place calls to CCH
customers will offset most of this revenue loss. In other words, if an inmate’s friends and family
members, who generally fund the inmate’s telephone usage, have a fixed budget to spend on
calls with the inmate, the lower local rates facilitated by Millicorp merely will cause CCH
customers to spend more time talking with the inmate. Thus, the inmates’ ICS provider will
generate a similar amount of revenue as if the inmate was placing long-distance calls, but the
inmate will have increased contact with his or her friends and family enabled by the fact that
calls to these CCH customers are local calls.
Even though Millicorp’s services only may have a small overall impact on the revenue
and profits of ICS providers, it appears that ICS providers nevertheless block calls to CCH
customers primarily for financial reasons. Despite this, ICS providers attempt to justify the
blocking of Millicorp-assigned telephone numbers by arguing that CCH and similar services
pose security threats. However, the Commission should be skeptical of such claims. ICS
providers fail to acknowledge that calls to CCH subscribers are subject to the same security
protocols as all other inmate calls. Furthermore, they criticize CCH’s service for security
characteristics shared by their own systems. ICS providers also unfairly single out and block
calls to CCH customers while permitting calls to the customers of substantially similar services
such as Google Voice and Vonage. Finally, although calls to local and non-local CCH numbers
share the same characteristics from a security perspective, ICS providers only block inmate calls
to revenue-reducing local CCH numbers and tend not to block inmate calls to CCH-assigned
numbers that are not local to an inmate’s confinement facility.
If the security of inmate calls placed using existing ICS system is indeed a concern that
needs to be addressed, the Commission should establish and enforce uniform, bright-line rules

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 11
regarding when call blocking is permissible. Such rules would better and more impartially
maintain the security of inmate calls. ICS providers should not be permitted to arbitrarily
practice self help by only blocking calls that impact their revenue.

Calls to CCH Customers Are Subject to the Same Security Protocols as Calls to
Any Other Telephone Number

Inmate calls to CCH customers are subject to the same security protocols as any other
inmate call, including (i) blocking of calls to protected phone numbers (e.g., judges, witnesses,
and prosecutors), (ii) limiting outgoing calls to only those call recipients identified by the inmate
by name and telephone number, (iii) monitoring and recording all calls, and (iv) the generation
of call logs containing the pre-approved telephone number to which each inmate call is placed.29
In addition, each telephone number dialed by inmates must be pre-approved by their ICS
provider, which provides ICS providers an additional opportunity to collect information
regarding the call recipient.30 For example, GTL pre-approves phone numbers “manually (i.e.,
uses human-to-human verification) to verify whether a called party is who he or she claims to be
. . . .”31 The CCH service does not prevent or interfere with such verification processes.
For these reasons, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) does not have a policy
requiring the blocking of calls to CCH customers. The BOP operates a federal ICS system to
manage inmate calls throughout most of its 119 facilities and this system is substantially similar
to the ICS platforms operated by Securus and GTL on behalf of many state and local prison
systems. Unlike Securus and GTL, however, the BOP does not automatically block calls to CCH
customers provided that the names and addresses of such customers appear in publicly available
reverse directory systems so that they can be accessed by BOP representatives. Millicorp
updates such directory systems on a daily basis with its customer information to ensure that the
directories can be used to determine the identity and address of inmate call recipients. As a
result, CCH customers can receive calls from their friends and family members incarcerated in
federal prisons.


Securus Petition at 3. Securus states that accountholder information associated with a prepaid
account opened with Securus by friends or families of inmates is not a reliable indicator of who is
receiving calls placed to the accountholder’s Securus-registered telephone number because Securus often
does not cross check the accountholders’ billing records against the Securus-registered telephone number.
If Securus desired to further increase its ability to identify call recipients, this would be one method of
doing so.

See Securus Petition at 3.


Reply Comments of Global Tel*Link Corporation, filed September 10, 2009, at 12.

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 12

Securus Unfairly Faults CCH For Limits Shared By Its Own System

Securus claims the blocking of calls to CCH customers is necessary for security reasons,
but fails to mention that ICS suffers from basic technological limitations that prevent ICS
providers from uniformly identifying who an inmate calls and the physical locations of the call
recipients. ICS providers should not be permitted to discriminate against Millicorp’s services for
failing to meet a security standard that the ICS providers themselves cannot satisfy.
ICS providers face practical and technological limits when identifying who and where
inmates call. First, even if an ICS provider can confirm the residence where an inmate call is
terminated, the ICS provider cannot know who physically received the call. Second, if a call
recipient is using a prepaid mobile service that does not collect identification information, there
is no way for the ICS provider to identify the call recipient’s identity from the telephone number
called. Instead, as with Millicorp’s CCH customers, an ICS provider is required to rely on the
information provided by the inmate and/or the call recipient when the call recipient’s mobile
phone number is added to the inmate’s approved calling list. Nevertheless, ICS providers do not
consistently block calls to such mobile phone numbers. Third, Securus’ technology to prevent
call forwarding and three-way calls32 is limited to services provided by the recipient’s telephone
service provider. If the call recipient uses customer premises equipment to link multiple
telephone lines, the three-way calling or call forwarding cannot be detected by an ICS provider.
Each of these technical limitations prevents an ICS provider from detecting the identity
and/or location of an inmate call recipient who desires to remain anonymous. It is disingenuous
for ICS providers to assert that inmate calls to CCH customers are required to be blocked due to
security concerns when any such concerns are applicable to calls regularly permitted by ICS

Millicorp’s CCH Service Provides Equal or Greater Security Than Is Provided by
Vonage and Google Voice, Two Services Permitted By Securus

Securus claims to permit inmate calls to users of Vonage and Google Voice.33 Yet CCH
makes available to law enforcement an amount of information about call recipients and their


See Ex Parte Letter from Stephanie A. Joyce, Counsel to Securus, to Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 09-144, dated December 14, 2009, at 8-9 (“Securus Dec. 14, 2009 Ex

See Securus Reply Comments at n.14 (“Securus is not blocking calls to Vonage or Google
Voice subscribers. . . . In fact, Securus has gone to considerable effort to avoid blocking calls to these
legitimate VoIP-based service providers, for the reasons explained herein.”); Securus Dec. 14 Ex Parte at
4; Ex Parte Letter from Stephanie A. Joyce, Counsel to Securus, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC,
WC Docket No. 09-144, dated February 16, 2010, at 4-5. Despite these representations by Securus in this

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 13
locations that is equal to or greater than the information available from Vonage, Google Voice,
and other IP-based telephone service providers that offer their users phone numbers that are local
to a location chosen by the user. Accordingly, if security concerns were the actual motivation of
ICS providers for blocking calls to CCH customers, then such ICS providers would not permit
calls to users of Vonage, Google Voice, or other IP-based telephone services providers.
Moreover, CCH does not mask calls or seek to hide the identities of its customers in any way
and, in fact, takes extra steps to ensure that the identities of its customers are available to ICS
providers through publicly accessible reverse directories.
Google Voice and Vonage SimulRing and Enhanced Call Forwarding, as well as
numerous other IP-based telephone service providers, permit their customers to control and
modify via the Internet which physical device or devices will receive calls placed to their
provider-assigned telephone numbers, which in most cases can be a telephone number that is
local to any location chosen by the user.34 Such services allow calls placed to a single telephone
number assigned by the provider to ring a user’s primary landline, cell phone, business number,
and/or any other telephone number chosen by the user. Further, users can be assigned a
telephone number that is local to any location chosen by the user and also can easily and quickly
change which physical device(s) receive incoming calls, including devices that are in locations
proceeding, Millicorp understands based on discussions with its customer that inmate calls to Google
Voice and Vonage are intermittently blocked by Securus.

In addition to Vonage and Google Voice, many other IP-based communications providers offer
consumer services with similar functionality to Millicorp’s CCH service. These services generally allow
a user to purchase a phone number that is local to any location of the user’s choice and then terminate
calls placed to this local number to any telephone (or softphone) selected by the user. See, e.g., Skype,
Online Numbers, available at;
magicJack, available at; Ribbit Mobile, Ribbit Numbers, available at; Line2, How It Works: Overview, available at; VOXOX, available at Several services
designed for business use offer the same type of call terminating functionality. For example, Digium, Inc.
(“Digium”) produces the open source Asterisk VoIP software that accounted for 85% of the market share
of open source IP-based PBXs for the small business market as of January 2009. See John Malone, Open
Source PBX is 18% of North American Market, NO JITTER (Jan. 28, 2009) available at Digium just released a
new version of its software which enables users to direct incoming calls to up to six different phones in
any location, including softphones. See Kevin Casey, Digium Intros Switchvox 5.0 for SMBs,
INFORMATION WEEK SMB (June 6, 2011) available at IWK News. Other
services targeting the business market offer similar functionality. See, e.g., Voice, Virtual Phone Number
Features, available at; Phonebooth, available at; RingCentral, How It Works, available at; and Twilio Cloud Communications, OpenVBX,
available at

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 14
that would otherwise be long distance from the caller.35 Many such providers, including Google
Voice and Vonage, also provide call forwarding and three-way calling to their users, thereby
enabling callers to such users ultimately to reach arbitrary numbers, including numbers intended
to be protected from inmate calls by ICS providers.
By contrast, Millicorp’s CCH service matches a single local number to a single registered
phone number, enabling law enforcement to easily trace inmate calls back to the called
individual who subscribed to the CCH service and his or her billing address.36 Additionally,
Millicorp retains call detail records of every call placed to a CCH-issued telephone number,
including the terminating telephone number, the length of the call, and the date and time of the
call. Millicorp consistently has provided this information to law enforcement representatives
when asked to do so, including local police forces and federal law enforcement agencies.
Moreover, Millicorp does not permit call-forwarding or three-way calling that could enable
inmates to reach an arbitrary phone number other than the number initially called by the inmate.
Securus characterizes Millicorp’s CCH service as “a grave risk to prison security and
public safety” because the ICS provider cannot conclusively establish the identity and the
location of the call recipient.37 Yet Securus appears to ignore the fact that numerous IP-based
telephone services collect less information about their subscribers and offer less secure services
than Millicorp, such as call-forwarding and three-way calling.38
Securus also contends that it blocks calls to Millicorp’s CCH customers because the
customers’ CCH-issued local telephone numbers are not registered in any telephone number
database, such as the Line Information Data Base (“LIDB”).39 According to Securus, numbers

See, e.g., Google Voice Help: Call Forwarding with Your Google Number, available at (“You can set up to six
phones to ring when someone calls your Google number. For example, with Google Voice, you can ring
your home landline phone, work phone, mobile phone, and Gizmo number, just when someone calls your
Google number.”); Vonage Simultaneous Ring Feature, available at nav simulring&refer id=WEBHO
0706010001W (“When your Vonage phone rings, you can choose up to 5 other phone numbers anywhere
in the United States including Puerto Rico and Canada to ring.”).

Every customer that establishes a CCH account with Millicorp is required to provide his or her
(i) name, (ii) billing address, (iii) phone number, and (iv) credit card or other payment information.

Securus Petition at 8.


See Millicorp Comments, Affidavit of Timothy Meade ¶ 20 (“Millicorp disables all user
enabled call forwarding and three-way calling features for its CCH service offering so as to comply with
confinement facility regulations prohibiting call forwarding and three-way calling.”).

See Securus Reply Comments at 11; Securus Dec. 14, 2009 Ex Parte at 4-5.

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 15
assigned by Vonage to its users are registered to such users in the LIDB, along with the user’s
physical address.40 Thus, Securus asserts that law enforcement officials examining the call detail
record generated by an inmate call to a Vonage customer can also view the terminating number’s
registered physical address.41 However, Millicorp understands that not all Vonage-issued
telephone numbers are registered in the LIDB database because the majority of carriers that
provide telephone numbers to IP-based telephone service providers will not allow LIDB updates
by their customers,42 including several carriers that are relied upon by both Millicorp and
Vonage for telephone numbers.43 Further, to mitigate this concern, Millicorp directly submits its
customers’ identity and location information on a daily basis to the National Directory
Assistance database administered by LSSi Corp. (“LSSi”). LSSi is a Tier 1 provider of North
American directory services and is relied upon by most national carriers to populate their
directory services.44 As a result, unlike the telephone numbers assigned to users of many IPbased telephone services providers, telephone numbers assigned by Millicorp to its CCH
customers are available in most reverse directories thereby enabling any member of the public to
determine the identity and the physical address of CCH’s customers from their CCH-assigned
telephone numbers.
Furthermore, it is not possible for many IP-based telephone services providers, including
Google Voice, consistently to register their users’ information in the LIDB because they do not
collect the addresses of their users or confirm their identities. For example, to sign up for a
Google Voice subscription, a Google Voice user only is required to provide an email address and

See Securus Reply Comments at 10; Securus Dec. 14, 2009 Ex Parte at 4.


See Securus Reply Comments at 5; Securus Dec. 14, 2009 Ex Parte at 4-5.


Millicorp previously indicated that it will submit CCH customer information directly to the
LIDB database if the Commission requires carriers from whom VoIP providers obtain telephone numbers
to offer this capability to their VoIP provider customers. See Ex Parte Letter from William P. Cox,
Counsel to Millicorp, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 09-144, dated December
16, 2010, at 6 (“Millicorp Dec. 16 Ex Parte”).

In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that Vonage registers all of its telephone numbers in
the LIDB, the registered physical address of Vonage’s customer may not be the actual address of the
customer or the location (or telephone number) where such customer receives inmate calls. For example,
using Vonage’s SimulRing, a customer in Texas can set his or her Vonage account to ring both landline
and cell phones in multiple states or even multiple countries.

See (“LSSiDATA is
the primary resource for 411 Directory Assistance as the only enterprise vendor to provide aggregated
contact information to telecommunication providers in North America. . . . LSSIDATA is a Tier 1
supplier of data as the only enterprise-based vendor to compile residential, business, and government
names, addresses and phone numbers directly from (and in partnership with) the vast majority of carriers
in North America.”).

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 16
a telephone number to which Google Voice should terminate calls.45 A Google Voice user is not
required to provide his or her name. As a result, Securus’ position that completion of inmate
calls to Google Voice customers is somehow more secure than completion of calls to CCH
customers simply is inaccurate. To the contrary, Millicorp takes extra measures, such as
submission of its subscriber’s information to LSSi for inclusion in the National Directory
Assistance database, to ensure that ICS providers can obtain more information about CCH
customers called by inmates than the ICS providers can obtain about call recipients that are users
of other IP-based telephone services, such as Google Voice.

ICS Providers’ Targeting of Local Numbers Further Indicates That Protecting
Profits, Not Security, Is Their True Priority

If Securus and GTL’s actual motivation for blocking inmate calls to CCH customers is
security concerns, one would expect that all CCH numbers–both those local to a confinement
facility and those outside the confinement facility’s local calling area–would be treated equally
by Securus and GTL.46 Although ICS providers earn more revenue from long-distance calls,
local and long-distance calls to CCH customers are identical from a security perspective. ICS
providers have no additional information about the location or identity of long-distance call
recipients than local call recipients and calls to both are terminated by Millicorp using the same
IP-based technology. Yet Millicorp has found that Securus blocks local telephone numbers
assigned by CCH but does not block CCH-assigned long-distance telephone numbers. In fact,
CCH customers are regularly told by Securus and GTL representatives that the reason their
CCH-assigned telephone numbers are being blocked is that the area code is different from the
local area code of the customers’ residence. Further, they are told that their telephone number
will be unblocked if they obtain a new number with an area code that is local to their home.
Because the security profile of local and long-distance calls to CCH customers is the same from
the perspective of ICS providers, this clearly demonstrates that the factor that determines when
calls will be blocked merely is whether the calls are local (and therefore generate less revenue) or
long-distance and has nothing to do with security concerns about the call recipient or its
telephone service provider.
Similarly, it has been Millicorp’s experience that Securus and GTL generally do not
make any effort to confirm the identity or location of inmate call recipients who have telephone

See Ex Parte Letter from William P. Cox, Counsel to Millicorp, to Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 09-144, dated March 15, 2010, Exhibit C (“Millicorp Mar. 15 Ex
Parte”) (displaying the Google Voice Setup Screens).

Millicorp occasionally assigns to its international customers domestic telephone numbers that
are considered long-distance with respect to the confinement facilities at which the customers’ friends or
family members are incarcerated. Millicorp primarily does so when telephone numbers that are local to
the facilities are blocked by ICS providers. ICS providers generally do not block such long-distance
telephone numbers.

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 17
numbers that are long-distance from a confinement facility. Instead, they primarily focus their
call blocking efforts on CCH customers with local numbers. For example, Securus and GTL
have at times required local recipients of inmate calls, many of whom are CCH customers, to
provide utility bills or other proof that they reside at a local address. To the best of Millicorp’s
knowledge, Securus and GTL have not undertaken similar inquiries with respect to inmate call
recipients with telephone numbers that qualify as long-distance from an inmate’s confinement
facility. In addition, Millicorp has been told by many of its CCH customers that Securus
recently has begun contacting recipients of local inmate calls to determine whether they are
Millicorp customers and has told call recipients who identify themselves as Millicorp customers
that it is illegal to use Millicorp’s CCH service.47 Millicorp is unaware of any such efforts by
Securus to identify Millicorp customers that are long-distance from an inmate’s facility. Also,
Millicorp has been informed by multiple CCH customers that Securus and GTL expressly have
told local call recipients whom they have identified as CCH customers that their CCH-assigned
local telephone number either will be blocked by the ICS provider or that the CCH customer will
be charged the ICS providers’ higher long-distance rate for calls to their local CCH-assigned
number. These circumstances provide compelling evidence that the actual concern motivating
Securus and GTL’s impermissible call blocking activities are financial rather than securitybased.

The FCC Should Establish and Enforce Consistent, Bright Line Rules That
Cannot be Discretionarily Applied With Anti-Competitive Intent

If the Commission were to find plausible Securus and GTL’s security concerns regarding
VoIP-based subscriber services such as CCH (which, as set forth above, it should not), the

Separate and apart from the illegality of Securus’ call blocking, these invasive calls to
Millicorp’s customers may be violations of Securus’ statutory and regulatory obligations to protect
Consumer Proprietary Network Information (“CPNI”). Subject to certain exceptions, federal law limits
the use of CPNI by a carrier for purposes other than the provision of the telecommunications services
from which such CPNI is derived. See 47 U.S.C. § 222(a) (“Except as required by law or with the
approval of the customer, a telecommunications carrier that receives or obtains customer proprietary
network information by virtue of its provision of a telecommunications service shall only use, disclose, or
permit access to individually identifiable customer proprietary network information in its provision of (A)
the telecommunications service from which such information is derived, or (B) services necessary to, or
used in, the provision of such telecommunications service, including the publishing of directories.”). The
use of inmates’ CPNI to identify inmate call recipients, contact them, and determine whether they are
Millicorp customers is not a use of CPNI in furtherance of providing telecommunications services to the
inmate. Further, the Commission’s rules implementing the CPNI laws establish a policy against the use
of CPNI by a carrier to harm or otherwise gain a competitive advantage over other carriers. See 47 C.F.R.
§ 64.2005(b)(2) (“A telecommunications carrier may not use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI to
identify or track customers that call competing service providers. For example, a local exchange carrier
may not use local service CPNI to track all customers that call local service competitors.”).

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 18
Commission nevertheless should require ICS providers to cease their standardless, illegal call
blocking practices. Instead, the Commission should establish bright line, objective rules
regarding when it is permissible for ICS providers to block inmate calls.48 Such Commission
guidance would enable companies such as Millicorp to develop and provide innovative, secure,
and cost effective services to the families and friends of inmates without the fear of arbitrary
operational disruption and financial harm caused by call blocking by ICS providers.
These rules should take into account the increasingly IP-based nature of telephone
services. ICS providers should not be permitted unilaterally to deprive the friends and families
of inmates the benefits that can be derived from innovative IP-based communications
technologies by refusing to complete inmate calls to such individuals if they subscriber to IPbased telephone services. Further, ICS providers and state and local facilities should be
prohibited from discriminating against IP-based communications services that primarily serve
the friends and families of inmates, such as Millicorp. Any call blocking policy that is deemed
permissible by the Commission, if any, should be required to be applied to all IP-based telephone
service providers that use substantially similar practices to assign telephone numbers to their
customers and to route calls.
In addition, prior to blocking any inmate calls, an ICS provider should be required to
investigate “suspect” call recipients and only should be permitted to block calls to the intended
recipient if the intended recipient expresses a desire not to receive calls from the inmate or if it is
not possible to identify the individual to whom a telephone number is assigned. Such rules
would prevent the continued unilateral, arbitrary, and impermissible call blocking practices of
Securus, GTL, and other ICS providers.
Further, ICS providers should never be permitted to unilaterally determine which calls to
block. Instead, if the Commission determines to refrain from adopting bright line call blocking
rules applicable to ICS providers, then ICS providers only should be permitted to block calls that
they expressly are instructed to block by the state and local agencies that run the prison facilities.
Further, the Commission, at minimum, only should permit such call blocking by a facility if the
facility or its supervising state or local agency publicly has issued a statement of its call blocking

The Commission has a long history of regulating ICS under its Title II jurisdiction. This
demonstrates the Commission’s preemptive authority to impose regulations on ICS providers even if such
regulations are inconsistent with, and therefore prevent the enforcement of, inmate calling policies
adopted by the state and local governmental agencies responsible for the operation and/or supervision of
state and local confinement facilities. To the extent that the Commission desires to avoid preempting
such policies, the Commission at minimum should expressly prohibit ICS providers from blocking inmate
calls to the extent that such ICS providers are not expressly required to implement such call blocking by
narrowly tailored state or local laws or rules. By contrast, internal policies of state and local confinement
facilities that are not imposed by state and local governmental agencies should not be permitted to
withstand otherwise preemptive Commission regulations.

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 19
policies. By requiring prison call blocking policies to be publicly accessible, the Commission
can equip the customers of companies such as Millicorp with the information that they need to
refute the unfounded and often outlandish claims by ICS providers as to why the ICS providers
are blocking certain inmate calls. Moreover, this will provide voters with the ability to impact through
the election process any call blocking mandates imposed on ICS providers by state and local
governments. Further, such publicly accessible policies will enable companies such as Millicorp
to appropriately tailor their service offerings to comply with these policies and will halt the selfserving discretion used by ICS providers to determine unilaterally when to block calls.



Throughout this proceeding, Securus has repeatedly focused on Millicorp’s regulatory
status in an attempt to cast Millicorp as a nefarious interloper and thereby to distract the
Commission from the true issue in this proceeding—Securus’ impermissible call blocking
activities.49 The Commission should ignore this ruse. In this proceeding, Millicorp has referred
to its IP communications service as an interconnected VoIP service in an effort to respond to
these unwarranted assertions by Securus. Millicorp does in fact provide interconnected VoIP, as
defined by the FCC, to some CCH customers.50 Specifically, to the extent that Millicorp’s
customers connect a Millicorp-provided SIP adapter (i.e., Internet protocol-compatible customer
premises equipment) to their existing broadband service, they can receive and place calls over
the public switched telephone network using Millicorp’s service.
However, Millicorp also permits its customers to register to receive calls using their
existing landline or mobile telephone services, similar to non-CPE based IP communications
services provided by Vonage and Google Voice and many other IP-based telephone service
providers.51 Customers of Vonage’s SimulRing service and its Enhanced Call Forwarding

See, e.g. Securus Petition at 12 (“Securus sees no evidence that [Millicorp] submitted a
registration to the Commission or to the states that presently require VoIP service registration”); Securus
Reply Comments at 4 (“ConsCallHome is not a legitimate telecommunications service provider”);
Securus Dec. 14 Ex Parte at 2 (“Millicorp/ConsCallHome is not an ‘interconnected VoIP provider.’”);
Securus Feb. 16 Ex Parte at 4 (“The question whether Millicorp/ ConsCallHome is an ‘interconnected
VoIP provider’ must finally close.’”).

The Commission has defined interconnected VoIP as a service that (1) enables real-time, two
way voice communications; (2) requires a broadband connection from the user’s location; (3) requires
Internet protocol-compatible customer premises equipment; and (4) permits users generally to receive
calls that originate on the public switched telephone network and to terminate calls to the public switched
telephone network. See 47 C.F.R. § 9.3.

The Commission has not yet established a regulatory classification for such IP-based
communications services. This in no way renders Millicorp’s CCH service illegitimate. The

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 20
service are not required to use any Internet protocol-compatible CPE to receive calls using the
Vonage service. Likewise, Google Voice customers are never required to establish a broadband
connection or to use any Internet protocol-compatible CPE to receive calls using Google Voice.52
Instead, customers of these two services can receive calls placed to their Vonage or Google
Voice telephone number using a home telephone or cell phone not provided by Vonage or
Google.53 Under these circumstances, the Vonage SimulRing and Google Voice services are
very similar to Millicorp’s CCH service.
Ultimately, the fact that some of Millicorp’s customers receive inmate calls on an
existing telephone service does not render Millicorp’s service illegitimate or unlawful, nor does
it justify blocking inmate calls to CCH subscribers. It is telling that ICS providers only focus on
the regulatory categorization of Millicorp’s CCH service as a justification for blocking calls to
CCH subscribers, but ignore the identical issue with regard to Vonage and Google Voice
services.54 The Commission should recognize the ICS providers’ classification argument against
the CCH service as a red herring, and should instead address the real issue in this proceeding,
which is ICS providers’ illegal blocking of calls.

Commission does not prohibit the deployment of new and innovative technologies. For example, the
Commission has not yet determined whether interconnected VoIP qualifies as a telecommunications
service or an information service, yet interconnected VoIP has become a regulated mainstay of the
communications industry.

For this reason, Google has taken the position that it is not an interconnected VoIP provider.
According to the Google Voice website, “Google Voice isn’t a phone service, but it lets you manage all of
your phones. Google Voice works with mobile phones, desk phones, work phones, and VoIP lines.
There's nothing to download, upload, or install, and you don't have to make or take calls using a
computer.” See In recent
comments submitted to the Commission, AT&T agreed with this assessment. See AT&T Response to
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Letter, RM-11361, Aug. 21, 2009 (“Based on AT&T’s review of
the information available on the Google Voice website, however, it is our understanding that Google
Voice is not a Voice over Internet Protocol service that enables a user to send or receive voice alls in IP
format from a wireless handset.”).

See Millicorp Mar. 15, 2010 Ex Parte, Exhibit B (describing Vonage’s services) and Exhibit C
(describing Google Voice’s services).

See Securus Feb. 16 Ex Parte at 4; Securus Dec. 14 Ex Parte at 4; Securus Reply Comments at
8 and n. 14.

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 21


While the Securus Petition remains pending, ICS providers continue to harm inmates and
their friends and families, and companies such as Millicorp that serve them, through widespread
and impermissible call blocking. For many families, phone calls are the only way to keep in
touch with their imprisoned loved one. State correctional departments frequently transfer
inmates to confinement facilities located in other states. According to a 2005 survey, at least 43
states transfer inmates out of state.55 Often, the distance between the state in which the family
member lives and the state in which the inmate is confined is so great that it is impossible for the
friends and family of the inmate to visit, thereby leaving telephone conversations as the only
means for the inmate to retain ties to their pre-incarceration lives.56 Given that inmates’ families
often are low-income, the high cost of ICS providers’ long-distance rates are very problematic
and punish innocent Americans who simply wish to maintain contact with friends and family
High inmate calling rates also reduce the chances that inmates will be effectively
rehabilitated. A recent report issued by a diverse group that included correctional officials found
that high inmate telephone rates have a negative effect on the family and community ties of
prisoners.58 The strength of family and community ties has been found to be a significant
determining factor in the prevention of recidivism. Studies have found that prisoners who fail to
maintain these ties more often violate parole and return to prison when compared with their



See, e.g., Tracy Newton Comments, WC Docket No. 09-144 (dated Aug. 24, 2009); Esdwin E.
Dickens Comments, WC Docket No. 09-144 (dated Aug. 18, 2009).

See Comments of Citizens United for Rehabilitation of Errants Regarding Securus
Technologies, Inc. Petition for Declaratory Rulemaking, WC Docket No. 09-144, at 6 (filed August 31,
2009) (“CURE Comments”).

CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT 35-36 (John J. Gibbons & Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Comm’n CoChairs) (June 2006)).

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 22
counterparts who preserve such ties while incarcerated.59 Moreover, every parolee that does not
return to jail saves approximately $22,000 of taxpayer money.60
One crime that is undoubtedly amplified by excessive ICS rates is the smuggling of
contraband cell phones in prisons. Cell phones, some of which are prepaid and can be purchased
over the counter without identification, pose a much larger security threat than Millicorp’s
services. These cells phones are not subject to any of the ICS provider’s security procedures,
and, if they are of the prepaid variety, no records identifying their ownership exist. As a result,
the Commission is currently examining how to combat the use of contraband cell phones in
prisons.61 However, investigations of contraband cell phone use within prisons have established
that the vast majority of cell phone calls are placed to friends and families outside of the prison.62
In other words, many illicit cell phones smuggled into confinement facilities are not used for
nefarious undertakings, but instead are used as a means to stay connected with family members.
Following this logic, lawmakers in Texas recently concluded that increased access to prison
phones would cut down on the prevalence of illicit cell phones in confinement facilities and
therefore expanded access to prison phones.63
Securus and GTL’s egregious efforts to harm Millicorp’s business have only become
more aggressive during the nearly two years in which this proceeding has been pending before
the Commission. Most recently according to Millicorp’s CCH customers, Securus has begun to
directly contact inmate call recipients with local telephone numbers and ask if the call recipient
is a CCH customer. If the recipient replies affirmatively or refuses to answer, Securus blocks
inmates from calling that individual’s telephone number. Moreover, CCH customers regularly
report to Millicorp that when they call Securus and GTL representatives to complain about call
blocking the representatives outrageously claim that the use of CCH’s services is a felony and
CCH customers and the inmates who call them are subject to criminal prosecution for using the
services. In addition, Securus and GTL have asserted to numerous CCH customers that
Millicorp’s CCH service is criminal, fraudulent, illegal, or under investigation by the FCC.

Creasie Finney Hairston, Family Ties During Imprisonment, Do They Influence Future
Criminal Activity? 52 FED. PROBATION 48, 49 (1988) (“The major conclusion of these studies is that the
maintenance of family and community ties during imprisonment is positively related to post-release

Vince Beiser, Prisoners Run Gangs, Plan Escapes, and Even Order Hits with Smuggled Cell
Phones, WIRED MAGAZINE, May 22, 2009, available at: prisonphones.

See Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau to Hold Workshop/Webinar on Contraband
Cell Phone Use in Prisons, Public Notice (rel. Sep. 13, 2010).

See Beiser, supra, note 60.



Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 23
Further, CCH customers have been told that prison personnel will take retaliatory action against
inmates that place calls to CCH-assigned telephone numbers. In recent months, Millicorp has
seen a sharp rise in the number of such reports by CCH customers regarding the actions of
Securus and GTL, which has been accompanied by a sharp increase in the number of Millicorp
CCH customers which have cancelled their CCH service. However, Millicorp’s ability to take
legal action to prevent these potentially tortious assertions by Securus and GTL is substantially
hampered by the Commission’s inaction on the Securus Petition to date.64


For the reasons set forth herein, Millicorp renews its request for the Commission to deny
the Securus Petition and prohibit ICS providers from continuing their persistent use of call
blocking to prevent the friends and families of inmates from using Millicorp’s CCH service.
Such impermissible call blocking costs inmates and their friends and families substantial sums in
exorbitant ICS charges every year and prevents inmates from maintaining adequate contact with
their friends and families during their incarceration. In the alternative, to the extent that the
Commission determines that certain IP-based telephone services provided to inmate call
recipients pose a security concern despite the evidence provided by Millicorp to the contrary,
Millicorp requests the Commission to establish a bright line rule as to when ICS providers may
block inmate calls. In light of their exclusive control of ICS at the confinement facilities with
which they contract, ICS providers should not be permitted continued unfettered discretion to
arbitrarily determine which inmate calls to block.


Phil Marchesiello
Counsel to Millicorp

Chairman Julius Genachowski
Commissioner Michael Copps
Commissioner Robert McDowell
Commissioner Mignon Clyburn
Sharon Gillett, Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau

See supra note 21.

Marlene H. Dortch
June 17, 2011
Page 24
Austin Schlick, General Counsel
Zac Katz, Legal Advisor to Chairman Genachowski for Wireline, International, and
Internet Issues
Margaret McCarthy, Policy Advisor to Commissioner Copps for Wireline
Christine Kurth, Policy Director and Wireline Counsel to Commissioner McDowell
Angela Kronenberg, Wireline Legal Advisor to Commissioner Clyburn
Albert Lewis, Chief, Pricing Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau
Julie Veach, Associate General Counsel
Diane Griffin Holland, Assistant General Counsel
Trent Harkrader, Wireline Competition Bureau
Marcus Maher, Legal Advisor to Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau
Pamela Arluk, Assistant Chief, Pricing Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau
Michele Berlove, Wireline Competition Bureau
Lynne Engledow, Pricing Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau
Chin Yoo, Investigations & Hearings Division, Enforcement Bureau
Jennifer Prime, Acting Legal Advisor, Office of the Bureau Chief, Wireline Competition


I, Timothy Meade, President of Millicorp, which operates the
service, declare under penalty of perjury that the factual assertions set forth in the ex parte letter
in WC Docket 09-144 to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission,

from Phil MarchesieUo, counsel to Millicorp, dated June 17, 2011 , are true and correct to the best
of my knowledge and belief.
Executed on June 17, 2011.

Tuno thy Mead e, Pres) ent